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TOXIC TORTS: THE DEVIL IS IN THE DOSE
Bernard D. Goldstein, M.D.∗
SUMMARY
Dose is a central concept in toxicology—”the dose makes the
poison” is the oldest maxim in the field.1 The judicial system
nevertheless appears uncomfortable in dealing with dose issues and
instead prefers reductionist approaches which overly simplify
decision-making about general and specific causation in toxic tort
cases to the detriment of both plaintiffs and defendants.
Contrasting this approach, scientific enquiry is moving toward a
more systems based, holistic approach to incorporating a broad
range of scientific evidence. This is particularly true for the
examination of chemical causation of disease. Longstanding sciencebased processes evaluating the weight of evidence have increased
the extent to which they incorporate scientific data from multiple
disciplines, including toxicological studies exploring dose-related

Bernard D. Goldstein is Professor of Environmental and Occupational
Health and former Dean of the University of Pittsburgh Graduate School of
Public Health. The author would like to thank Russellyn Carruth of the
University of Pittsburgh School of Law for her many insightful observations on
this subject and for her contributions to this manuscript. The author also thanks
Jennifer Geiselhart for her very helpful advice and Jessica Kanzler for her
technical assistance.
1
See David L. Eaton, Scientific Judgment and Toxic Torts— A Primer in
Toxicology for Judges and Lawyers, 12 J.L. & POL ’ Y 5, 15 (2003).
“Dose” is defined as concentration multiplied by frequency or duration.
Thus exposure to 10 parts per million (“ppm”) in air for one hour to a pollutant
is a dose of 10 ppm-hours. Exposure to 1 ppm in air for 10 hours also results in
a dose of 10 ppm-hours. In the first example the dose rate is higher than the
second example, but the total dose is the same.
∗
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mechanisms of disease. This runs counter to recent judicial
decisions that more narrowly define the evidence acceptable in a
toxic tort case.2
I.

INTRODUCTION

The interface of science and law is central to toxic tort
litigation. The challenge of eliciting valid and pertinent expert
opinions in toxic tort cases has led to changes in the role of the
judge and to what is admissible in court.3 Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals, Inc.4 and other cases have had a major impact
upon toxic tort litigation at a time when the science is also changing
rapidly. 5 This article explores the role of the central toxicological
concept of dose in toxic tort litigation. Additionally, this article
contends that science and law are going in opposite directions—in
science towards a more systems-based holistic approach to
2

This article focuses upon environmental cases. Litigation concerning
pharmaceuticals and medical devices may raise different issues because of the role
of the FDA. See infra text accompanying notes 27–31.
3
See sources cited infra note 5.
4
509 U.S. 579 (1993).
5
I will not delve into the legal arguments concerning whether the intention
of the Supreme Court in Daubert was to liberalize the rules of scientific
evidence. The proposition that in fact the opposite has occurred has been
advanced by legal scholars and by scientists. See Lisa Heinzerling, Doubting
Daubert, 14 J.L. & POL ’ Y 65 (2006) (discussing the “mess that has followed
in the wake of Daubert”); Ronald L. Melnick, A Daubert Motion: A Legal
Strategy to Exclude Essential Scientific Evidence in Toxic Tort Litigation, 95
AM. J. P UBLIC HEALTH S30 (2005) (discussing difficulties for plaintiffs to prevail
in Daubert motions); CARL F. CRANOR, Judge-Jury Responsibilities and the
Right to a Jury Trial, in T OXIC T ORTS: SCIENCE, LAW , AND THE POSSIBILITY
OF J USTICE 70–71 (2006) (noting that, under Daubert, plaintiffs have to “win
twice”). This proposition is consistent with my argument that courts have
generally become reductionist in their approach to toxic torts. The potential
impact on toxic torts of changes in science arising out of molecular biology and
increased understanding of the human genome have been discussed by Gary
Marchant and by Jamie Grodsky. Gary E. Marchant, Toxicogenomics and Toxic
Torts, 20 TRENDS IN BIOTECH. 329 (2002); Jamie A. Grodsky, Genomics and
Toxic Torts: Dismantling the Risk-Injury Divide, 59 STAN. L. REV . 1671
(2007).
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understanding the revealed complexity of human biology and of
cause-and-effect relations, while in law towards a more reductionist
and overly simplistic approach. I use examples to demonstrate how
a reductionist approach inappropriately excludes animal toxicology
and mechanistic information of pertinent value in evaluating a toxic
tort.
II. T HE SCIENCE OF T OXICOLOGY
Toxicology is the science of poisons. It is an ancient science,
reflecting the trial and error approaches of our ancestors in selecting
nutritious components of an otherwise highly toxic natural world.
The use of known poisons to kill animals or enemies reflects this
same experimentation. Toxicologists accept Paracelcus—a 16th
century alchemist and a bit of a charlatan—as their ancestor and
credit him with the first law of toxicology—that the dose makes
the poison. In the present review, I focus primarily on issues
related to dose, although I will also discuss aspects of the two
other major maxims that are the basis for modern toxicology: 1)
that chemicals are specific in their biological effects, which has been
credited to Ambrose Pare;6 and 2) that humans are animals.

6

Bernard D. Goldstein & M.A. Gallo, Paré’s Law: The Second Law of
Toxicology, 60 T OXICOLOGICAL SCI . 194–95 (2001). Paré told the King of
France that he had wasted his money in purchasing what was claimed to be an
antidote to all poisons. Paré reasoned that each poison had its own specific
mechanism of action and that a universal antidote did not exist. The king put
Paré’s reasoning to the test. The king’s apothecary gave a man condemned to be
hung a poison followed by a so-called universal antidote. The condemned man
died anyhow, thereby proving Paré’s point. Id.
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A. The Maxims of Toxicology7
1.

The Dose Makes the Poison

Depending upon dose, everything is poisonous, including such
essentials as water and salt. Dose is defined as concentration
multiplied by frequency or duration—it is not just the exposure
level at any one point in time. Understanding how dose affects
response is central to the science of toxicology. Dose-response
curves are a classic means of illustrating this relationship, and
developing a dose-response curve through direct observation or
through extrapolation is an essential element of the function of
toxicologists. Extrapolation may be from high to lower doses, from
one group of humans to another, or between species.
Toxicologists generally posit two main dose response curves:
those that have a “threshold” and those that do not. 8 Certain
chemicals produce no effects at low doses. The highest dose at
which no effect is observed for these chemicals is known as the
threshold.9 The presumption that a chemical has a threshold is of
obvious importance to toxic torts in that it permits the argument

7

These maxims also underlie the four-part risk assessment paradigm:
hazard identification, dose-response analysis, exposure analysis, and risk
characterization. Dose-response analysis is clearly based on the dose makes the
poison; specificity is the basis for hazard identification; and both depend heavily
on extrapolating from animal studies. Bernard D. Goldstein & Russellyn
Carruth, Toxicology: Scientific Status, in MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE: T HE
LAW AND SCIENCE OF EXPERT TESTIMONY 149 (Faigman et al. ed., vol. 3
2007).
8
Reviews of toxicological science in relation to toxic torts can be found in
Joseph V. Rodricks, Evaluating Disease Causation in Humans Exposed to
Toxic Substances, 14 J.L. & POL ’ Y 39 (2006); Goldstein & Carruth, supra
note 7, at 122–50; Bernard D. Goldstein & Mary S. Henifin, Reference Guide
on Toxicology, in REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 401–37 (2d
ed. 2000); Ellen K. Silbergeld, The Role of Toxicology in Causation: A
Scientific Perspective, 1 CTS HEALTH SCI . & L. 374–78 (1991).
9
The technical and more appropriate term is a “no-observed effect level,” or
NOEL. Goldstein & Henifin, supra note 8, at 407.
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that a dose was too low to cause a particular plaintiff’s injury.10 As
dose increases, so does response, until eventually there is a dose
which has maximal effect—perhaps the death of the organism.
The second general type of a dose response curve is one that is
considered to have no threshold. The most important example for
toxic torts is that of cancer. The underlying cause of many cancers
is a persistent genetic mutation allowing the unbridled growth of a
cell which then results in a clone of cancer cells.11 As any one
molecule can theoretically cause this persistent mutation, no
threshold exists below which the risk is zero. The dose response
curve relating the level of a cancer causing chemical to the risk of
cancer is usually considered to be roughly linear; e.g., if the risk of
cancer for a dose of 100 units is X, then the risk of cancer for a
dose of 200 units is likely to be about twice the amount of X and
the risk of cancer for a dose of 50 units only one-half X.12

10

This form of a dose-response curve is not only scientifically acceptable
but easily understood by a layperson. The smallest residue of a ground up baby
aspirin tablet is useless for treating an adult headache, but an overdose of aspirin
can be fatal.
11
Normally, a progenitor cell, such as a cell at the base of our skin, divides
into two other cells: another progenitor cell and a cell that will mature and die.
Put very simply, cancer is caused by a genetic mutation leading the progenitor
cell to form two progenitor cells, which themselves continue to divide to form
other progenitor cells. As a mutation can be caused by a chemical or physical
agent producing a single small change in the DNA constituents of a gene, it is at
least theoretically possible that any one molecule of a chemical, or packet of
radiation, capable of changing DNA can lead to a cancer-causing mutation. Note
that most mutations are silent, kill the cell, or do something other than cause
cancer. Stable mutations of germ cells can similarly lead to inherited disorders.
Cancer is usually a more complex process than a single mutation.
12
Dose-response estimation for carcinogens is somewhat more complex in
its use than this reasonable approximation, particularly in the usual situation in
which extrapolation is needed from high to low dose or from animals to
humans. There are also carcinogens that clearly have thresholds. See, e.g., infra
notes 64 and 65 concerning saccharin. However, in essence, the “burden of
proof” is on industry to prove that a carcinogen has a threshold. The question of
whether a different dose-response approach should be used for non-genotoxic
carcinogens remains under debate.
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2. Specificity of Effects

Chemical and physical agents have specific effects related to
both the inherent physiochemical properties of the agent and the
biological niche in which it functions. For example, benzene can
cause leukemia and asbestos can cause lung cancer, but not vice
versa. The concept of specificity—that an agent affects certain
biological systems but not others—is a clearly established principle
of toxicology.13 It is also intuitively understood by lay persons.
For example, anyone may take aspirin for a headache and a laxative
for constipation, but the medicines are not interchangeable.
Pharmaceutical drug development to a large extent depends upon
working out the relation between chemical structure and both the
specificity of a desired effect and the avoidance of undesired
effects. Small changes in chemical structure can have a major impact
on toxicity in terms of both specificity (general causation) and the
extent of human susceptibility to the agent. 14
3. Humans are Animals
Much of modern toxicology is based on the study of laboratory
animals. There is a commonality of biological function across
species. All biological systems must obtain energy, build structure
and release waste. The similarity in cellular and organ function is
particularly strong among mammals such that extrapolation of
effects from one species to another is accepted by the scientific
community as a means of evaluating the toxicity of external agents.
In terms of general causation, the specificity of toxic effects on
organs is relatively similar across mammals, e.g., a kidney poison in
13

Somewhat confusing is that the legal equivalent to toxicological
specificity is general causation; while specific causation in a toxic tort suit is
related to dose rather than toxicological specificity.
14
For example, n-hexane, the six carbon straight chain hydrocarbon
component of gasoline, is toxic to nerves, while the closely related 5 and 7
straight chain hydrocarbons, n-pentane and n-heptane, have no such toxicity.
This is because of a specific biological niche within the neuron that spatially
allows chemical interaction by a metabolite of n-hexane but not the slightly
smaller metabolite of n-pentane or the slightly larger metabolite of n-heptane.
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one species is likely to be a kidney poison in another, although
there are certainly exceptions. There is more variability among
species in dose-response due to differences in absorption,
distribution, metabolism, excretion, function and target organ
susceptibility. As extrapolation of dose-response from animals to
humans is central to deciding appropriate regulatory protection,
there is a wealth of research data focusing upon these pathways. 15
Although extrapolation can be complex, there is sufficient
information to permit reliable extrapolation in many situations.
A lay person reading the scientific literature might conclude,
erroneously but understandably, that human responses most often
differ from other mammals. This misconception is a by-product of
a publication bias. In fact, there is a commonality of response
among mammals, including humans. A difference between humans
and animals is worth pursuing scientifically as such a difference can
be exploited to understand human physiology and response and it
is also readily publishable in a good scientific journal.16 This means
that review of the overall literature comparing animals and humans
will be biased toward differences rather than similarities.
Standard safety assessment for chemicals is based totally on
15

Physiologically based pharmacokinetic models (“PBPK”) are
increasingly used in risk assessment. These models provide linkages between
initial exposure to eventual disposition of a chemical and its metabolites,
including levels at target organs within the body. For a recent review and for an
example assessing the cancer risk of chloroform, see Kai H. Liao et al., Bayesian
Estimation of Pharmacokinetic and Pharmacodynamic Parameters in a Modeof-Action-Based Cancer Risk Assessment for Chloroform, 27(6) RISK ANALYSIS
1535 (2007).
16
Another major reason for the attention paid to differences between animals
and humans is that details affecting the extrapolation of animal data to humans
can affect regulatory agency conclusions about the risk potency of the agent.
Small differences in the estimated potency can mean major differences in the
extent of regulatory burden borne by the affected industry. In contrast to a
continuous variable, i.e., which of a wide range of numbers should be used to
set a regulatory standard, a toxic tort case in essence leads to a binary decision
based upon the underlying need of the plaintiff to meet the “more likely than
not” standard of tort law. Thus the details of animal/human differences, which
can have major implications for regulation, often are of trivial significance for a
toxic tort case, only serving to obfuscate the value of animal toxicology. See
Silbergeld, supra note 8, at 374–78.
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animal and in vitro studies.17 A battery of such tests, chosen for
their ability to predict toxicity to humans or the environment, is
performed on new chemicals. Extending animal and in vitro testing
to existing chemicals has been a major societal goal in recent years
as evidenced by the international agreement to test high production
volume chemicals18 and the European Union’s recent enactment of
the Registration, Evaluation, Authorisation, and Restriction of
Chemicals Act (“REACH”).19 This extensive new legislation to
regulate chemicals requires intensive toxicological testing of
essentially all new and existing chemicals, including components of
mixtures. It relies heavily on risk based approaches to establish
priorities for testing, including a reliance on production volume as a
surrogate for human dose.20
17

The reliance of standard safety assessment on testing chemicals in
animals is illustrative of the similarity in response between humans and
animals. It also reflects the fact that these are mostly new unmarketed chemicals
so there has been no human exposure, and experimentally exposing humans
raises ethical issues.
18
The high production volume effort has been a joint government and
industry activity that has been generally supported by the environmental
movement. See Testing of Certain High Production Volume Chemicals, 65 Fed.
Reg. 81,657 (proposed Dec. 26, 2000), available at http://www.epa.gov/EPATOX/2000/December/Day-26/t32497.htm; see also International Council of
Chemical Associations, Welcome to the Website of the Global Initiative on
High Production Volume (HPV) Chemicals, http://www.cefic.be/activities/hse/
mgt/hpv/hpvinit.htm (last visited Apr. 20, 2008).
19
The new EU legislation, the Registration, Evaluation and Authorization
of Chemical Substances, known as REACH, lays a very heavy burden on
industry to provide extensive toxicological testing on both new and existing
chemicals, including components of mixtures. A committee of the U.S. National
Research Council has recently proposed a greater emphasis on understanding the
mechanism of toxicity through advances in molecular biology as a means of
toxicity testing. NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, T OXICITY TESTING IN THE
21ST CENTURY: A V ISION AND A STRATEGY (National Academy Press 2007).
20
See Commission Regulation 1907/2006, Registration, Evaluation,
Authorisation and Restriction of Chemicals (REACH), 2007 O.J. (L 396) 1. A
discussion of the toxicological needs for REACH and its reliance on exposure
can be found in Sven O. Hanssen & Christina Ruden, Priority Setting in the
REACH System 90(2), in T OXICOLOGICAL SCIENCES 304–08 (2005). Further
information about REACH, including its pertinence to the United States, and
particularly to the amendment of our Toxic Substances Control Act, can be
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III. D OSE ISSUES RELATED TO GENERAL C AUSATION
General causation for cancer can be a particularly contentious
issue in toxic tort litigation.21 While dose considerations are usually
considered to be pertinent to specific causation, dosage is also
central to the general causation issue of whether a specific chemical
or physical agent can cause a specific disease. Not surprisingly
given the public and economic interest, weight of evidence
approaches have been most thoroughly developed for the
identification of carcinogens. However, it should be noted that the
same considerations apply to diseases other than cancer.
A. Weight of Evidence
Regulatory agencies and scientific organizations routinely use
“weight of evidence” processes to assess the relationship between
a specific chemical or physical agent and a specific adverse
outcome. These processes generally consist of an assemblage of
both the available evidence22 and a carefully selected internal or
external expert body to review this evidence and to develop a
consensus view.23

found in the papers and presentations from the conference. Conference on A New
EU Approach to Chemical Safety: Lessons for the United States, Conference on
the European Union (EU) regulation providing for REACH (June 7–9, 2007)
available at http://www.ucis.pitt.edu/euce/events/policyconf/07/index.html.
21
See, e.g., Joiner v. General Electric Co., 78 F.3d 524 (11th Cir. 1996)
(discussing whether PCBs are a human carcinogen); In re Agent Orange Product
Liability Litigation, 373 F. Supp. 2d 7 (E.D.N.Y. 2005) (discussing whether
Agent Orange and its dioxin contaminants are human carcinogens).
22
The evidence to be considered may be restricted, for example, to peerreviewed publications.
23
The contrast between a consensus conference and a toxic tort proceeding
epitomizes the difficulty expert scientists have serving at the interface between
science and law. Assume a reasonably mature topic with a large amount of
scientific evidence developed by many scientists. One can usually describe the
individual opinions of the scientist as to the weight of this evidence as falling
within a bell-shaped curve—some scientists giving more overall weight, some
less, but most toward the middle. The organization conducting the consensus
effort, e.g., the EPA Science Advisory Board or the National Academies of
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Two well-known organizations that are charged to assess the
issue of whether specific chemicals or workplace situations cause
cancer are the International Agency for Research on Cancer
(“IARC”) of the World Health Organization, and the U.S. National
Toxicology Program (“NTP”). In their deliberations, IARC and
NTP have routinely incorporated both epidemiological and
toxicological evidence to categorize the extent to which a chemical
is likely to be a carcinogen. Both have in recent years specifically
broadened the use of basic laboratory science related to
understanding the mechanism of action of a potential carcinogen to
help improve their categorization of carcinogens.24
The IARC process results in a formal vote of the assembled
experts as to whether a specific agent is toxic. The consensus
approach first occurs within four expert groups: epidemiology,
animal toxicology, exposure data, and mechanistic information.
Science, will attempt to assemble a relatively small subgroup of these experts
with the aim of covering the specific disciplinary expertise needed and balancing
any known biases. The group dynamics among scientists usually lead to the
participants coming up with a relatively centrist opinion. Scientists tend to be
conservative because of the high cost associated with being identified as
mistaken. In contrast, the ethical and well-trained lawyer will search the field of
legitimate experts to find those at their end of the bell-shaped curve and
recognizes that the opposing lawyer will be doing the same. The dynamics of
the litigation process greatly inhibit discussion among the experts (and the
appellate process precludes scientific discussion). It is of course true that
scientific opinion does not always fit a bell shaped curve, and not all scientific
experts are unbiased. It is nevertheless almost inherently impossible for the
confrontational approach that characterizes tort litigation to discover that there is
a consensus. This is a rationale for having judges select their own experts.
24
Vincent J. Cogliano et al., Use of Mechanistic Data in IARC
Evaluations, 49(2) ENVTL & MOLECULAR MUTAGENS 100 (2008). Note that the
regulatory goal underlying IARC and NTP often frustrates the needs of the toxic
tort process to have a clear understanding of general causation. Once a chemical
is concluded to be a known human carcinogen for a specific cancer endpoint,
there is relatively little interest in evaluating whether it causes a different tumor.
Either way it will be regulated as a carcinogen. An example is benzene, a known
cause of human acute myelogenous leukemia. It is highly probable that it is also
a cause of other hematological cancers, but this evidence is unlikely to be
considered by IARC or NTP who are moving forward with limited resources to
consider the weight of evidence about other potential, but not known, human
carcinogens.
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Although IARC is only concerned whether the carcinogen will
cause cancer, rather than with the potency of the carcinogen, dose
issues are crucial in each of the working groups. Not surprisingly,
the animal toxicology and mechanistic information groups look for
evidence of dose response before accepting an individual report
within the literature. This is also true for the epidemiology working
group for which there needs to be congruence both within a given
study and among all studies.
Dose-response is one of Bradford Hill’s25 criteria for accepting
an epidemiological association as causal. This is pertinent to
interpreting an individual study, e.g., workers with higher exposure
within a workplace are expected to have a higher level of any
causally-related adverse outcome. However, often overlooked is
that this criterion for interpreting epidemiological studies is not
limited to interpreting individual studies; rather, it applies when
evaluating the totality of the pertinent epidemiological studies. For
example, a group of epidemiological studies concerning a specific
agent can be stratified by dose in the individual studies, thereby
providing a means to interpret the relevance of these studies to a
cause and effect relationship. IARC committees often prepare a
table listing all of the epidemiological studies reviewed, arranged
from highest to lowest exposure. It is unlikely that a committee
will accept that a chemical is known to cause cancer if there is not a
reasonably strong, although not necessarily exact, relation between
the extent of exposure and the observed excess risk.26
25

Bradford Hill was a physician and epidemiologist who developed a
number of criteria for accepting causality. Austin Bradford Hill, The
Environment and Disease: Association or Causation?, 58 P ROC. OF THE ROYAL
SOC’ Y OF MED . 295–300 (1965).
26
I am personally familiar with toxic tort cases in which the plaintiffs have
alleged that exposure to benzene, a known cause of cancer of the blood system,
was responsible for causing kidney cancer. The plaintiffs put forward a number of
broad epidemiological studies in which there was an association between
benzene-containing solvents and an increased risk of kidney cancer. Such
solvents usually contain 0.1% benzene or less. However, because benzene is a
known cause of blood cancers, and literally millions of workers are exposed to
pure streams of benzene, a relatively large number of epidemiologic studies have
been performed evaluating the mortality of these workers. As these high dose
studies have not found a statistically significant increase in kidney cancer, it is
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IV. DOSE ISSUES RELATED TO SPECIFIC CAUSATION
Dose issues are central to specific causation in a toxic tort case
involving exposure to chemicals at the workplace or the
environment. There are two issues related to dose: 1) based upon
the dose-response evaluation, what is the dose at which the adverse
effect would be expected, and 2) what is the dose to the plaintiff.
Approaches to these dose issues in toxic tort cases are often guided
by prior judicial decisions that, to one versed in toxicology, seem
uninformed about dose concepts.
Perhaps these misguided judicial approaches are the result of
much of the relevant case law having been developed around
pharmaceutical products or devices. One major difference between
pharmaceutical agents and chemical toxins is that the dose of a
pharmaceutical agent such as Vioxx or Bendectin is assumed to be
that on the drug label, and someone either has or does not have a
silicon breast implant or a medical device. Here, the problem is that
courts attempt to transfer dose concepts from pharmaceutical
products or devices to their evaluation of toxins; the inherent
difference in the extent of variation in dose among those using a
pharmaceutical product and a toxin makes such a transfer
inappropriate.
Another major difference between environmental chemicals and
pharmaceutical agents is the extent of available pre-marketing
information. For a new drug, the FDA requires a clinical trial after a
series of studies in laboratory animals; thus, there is a reasonably
substantial amount of animal toxicology and human epidemiological
data already available before the drug is marketed. This is not true
for a chemical not intended for use as a drug. EPA’s pre-marketing
requirements under the Toxic Substances Control Act are relatively
minimal by comparison. Further, as discussed below, the
epidemiological gold standard of a randomized double-blind
not consistent with usual dose assumptions to propose that the epidemiological
studies of workers exposed to much lower benzene doses are indicative of a
causal relation. Note that there are at least two reasons why some
epidemiological studies show an association between exposure to solvents
containing low levels of benzene and kidney cancer: chance variations, and a
causal effect of some other component of the solvent mixture.
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controlled epidemiological study cannot be achieved in
epidemiological studies of the potential adverse consequences of
chemical or physical agents present in the workplace or
community.
For many epidemiological studies of toxic agents, dose is a
binary—yes or no—determination instead of a quantitative
expression.27 Nevertheless, in toxic tort cases involving nonpharmaceutical chemicals present in the workplace or general
environment, estimation of the dose experienced by the plaintiff,
and positioning that estimate on the appropriate dose response
curve for the individual plaintiff, are central to evaluating whether
the plaintiff’s condition more likely than not was caused by the
alleged exposure.
Below, I discuss two of the approaches that are commonly
used to simplify or obfuscate dose issues, one by defendants and
one by plaintiffs. From a legal standpoint, defense lawyers often
would like to require that there be a direct or reconstructed
quantitative estimation of the actual dose; while plaintiffs often
want to consider only the exposure level but not the duration
component of dose.
A. Non-Quantitative Estimation of Dose for a Toxic Tort Case
It is appropriate under certain circumstances to admit expert
testimony about sufficiency of dose without quantifying such a
dose. One such circumstance is an expert’s comparison of the
alleged exposure of the plaintiff with that of the exposure of one or
more cohorts of workers in whom there is epidemiologic evidence
of an effect. The argument in essence is similar to the right of a
police officer travelling at 65 mph in a 55 mph zone to ticket the
driver of a car that overtakes and passes the police vehicle without
direct radar evidence of the speed. While the judge might be willing
to accept a defense argument concerning the exact speed of the

27

This is particularly true for the initial studies identifying most known
chemical carcinogens. These were often discovered in epidemiological studies of
workers in which the surrogate for dose has been qualitative estimates of high
and low exposure. Quantitative exposure evaluation was subsequently added.
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driver, it is clear that the driver was going more than 65 mph.
When investigating toxins, it is often difficult to come by
quantitative evidence with which to prove causation. Employees
who participate in epidemiological studies and experience adverse
associations are generally part of a large work force; otherwise, it is
difficult to observe adverse effects at the dose levels to which the
workers have been subjected. A sufficiently large population that is
heavily exposed can be difficult to find as large workforces tend to
be well regulated through the enforcement of occupational health
standards, inspections by OSHA, and the imposition of fines for
failure to comply.28 Further, the legacy of past heavy exposures in
large worker populations can be difficult to study if there is an
extended latency period before the adverse effect occurs. For
example, a mesothelioma may not become manifest until decades
after the initial exposure to asbestos, at which time it is difficult to
perform follow up on the original cohort of workers or determine
their levels of exposure.29
Smaller workforces, including the individual contractor or
subcontractor, are often at a greater risk.30 It is in these poorly
regulated workforces that unusual and unsafe uses of chemicals
tend to result in much higher individual exposures. But it is also
these workforces in which exposure measurements are unlikely,
and estimates of exposure are difficult to determine. Again, the
passage of years between the exposure and the resultant health
effect complicates estimation of specific work practices, or of the
dilution factors related to ventilation of the workplace, or even the
28

A particularly problematic exception is the presence of subcontractors
working among the industry’s own employees. These subcontractors may not
receive the same safety training or protective equipment. Michael Gochfeld &
Sandra Mohr, Protecting Contract Workers: Case Study of the U.S. Department
of Energy’s Nuclear and Chemical Waste Management, 97(9) AM. J. PUB.
HEALTH 1607–13 (2007).
29
While this is not the place to discuss the issue, the continued failure of
some judicial jurisdictions to allow the latency period to affect a statute of
limitations for bringing a toxic tort case is also a reductionist approach that
rejects scientific knowledge. See CARL F. CRANOR, T OXIC TORTS: SCIENCE,
LAW , AND THE POSSIBILITY OF JUSTICE 173 (2006).
30
The hobbyist working at home in an enclosed space similarly can have
exposures well above those acceptable in the workplace.
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extent of use of the putative causal agent.
Another complication is that there can be exposure situations in
the poorly regulated workplace that are difficult to measure such as
leaking valves at a particular site within the complex or the washing
of hands or clothing in solvents. For example, workers are quick to
observe that using an available solvent such as benzene can be an
effective way to remove greasy substances from their hands or
work clothes at the end of the work day, but this results in
significant yet unmeasured transdermal exposure. This risky
practice can and should be prevented by rigorous job training and
precautionary approaches; unfortunately, these preventative
measures are not usually employed at a poorly regulated work site
or by a home hobbyist.
It is a reasonable approach for the expert reviewing a toxic tort
case to compare the plaintiff’s exposure with that described in the
epidemiology literature. Specifically, the expert can determine how
the work practices described by the plaintiff compare with the
work practices and resultant exposure of the cohorts of workers in
which epidemiologic evidence of a cause and effect relationship has
been reported. As an example, an individual working by him or
herself in a confined workspace with an open vat of a volatile
substance which splashes on their skin and clothes may have far
more exposure than reported for workers in a cohort with an
observed increase in cancer risk who worked in a large factory with
much less opportunity for such high level exposure. A careful
history of the plaintiff’s workplace practices can enable an expert
to assess how the plaintiff’s exposure compared to that observed
in cohorts in which an association between the exposure and the
effect was reported.31
Note that an indirect approach to estimation of dose can be of
benefit to the defense as well as the plaintiff. For example, assume
John Doe claims his leukemia was caused by chronic workplace
exposure to benzene at a level of 10 parts per million (ppm) in air,

31

Information about usual work practices requires expertise such as that
found in practitioners of occupational medicine, occupational safety, or industrial
hygiene. This expertise can be subject to usual judicial approaches to
admissibility of expert opinion.

566

JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY

eight hours per day. Doe sues the manufacturer of a solvent
mixture used in his work, alleging that it was the benzene in the
solvent that caused his leukemia. Assume we know that the solvent
mixture contains 0.1% benzene (1 part per thousand) and that the
mixture and benzene have similar volatility. Doe’s claim can be
readily disposed of by estimating what dose of solvent mixture
would have been required to expose him to 10 ppm benzene. To
get an exposure level of 10 ppm benzene, Doe’s exposure level for
the solvent mixture could be approximated as 10,000 ppm, but this
is well above the lethal dose of most solvents. Had he been exposed
to that much solvent, Doe would have lost consciousness and died
within a matter of minutes—long before he could have developed
leukemia.
B. The Potential Misuse of Dose-Based Regulatory Standards
as Evidence in a Toxic Tort Case
Exposure to a pollutant level that exceeds an environmental
regulatory standard is often used as evidence in a toxic tort case to
support the likelihood of a causal relation between the exposure
and the effect. There are two major reasons why this assumption is
contrary to the way dose is incorporated into regulatory standards.
First, dose is concentration multiplied by duration. Occupational or
environmental standards are rarely set for instantaneous exposure
levels, but rather are for durations of time that are chosen to be
pertinent to the health issue of concern.32 For cancer-causing
chemicals, the usual duration of concern is lifetime. Thus, being

32

An example of considerations related to the duration of the exposure is
provided by the change in the averaging time of the ozone standard to eight
hours after three decades of being at one hour. The change was based on the
recognition that prolongation of the morning rush hour and travel of ozone
precursors for long distances led to elevated ozone concentrations extending
throughout daylight hours rather than just being a one hour peak following
morning rush hour; that there were cumulative toxic effects of ozone exposure
over multiple hours; and that children, who are particularly at risk to ozone,
were likely to be out of doors and active for many hours during summertime
high ozone days. P.J. Rombout et al., Rationale for an Eight-Hour Ozone
Standard, 36 J. A IR POLLUTION CONTROL ASSOC. 913–17 (1986).
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exposed for just a few hours to a level slightly above the
concentration that would be allowed for a lifetime is of little risk
consequence. Second, the dose chosen for a regulatory standard is
based on societal goals for relatively low risk, usually far below the
risk that would be equivalent to “more likely than not.”33 For
cancer-causing agents, long term environmental risk goals are
usually in the range of 1/10,000 to 1/1,000,000 lifetime, although
higher risk levels are sometimes accepted in setting workplace
standards. For non-carcinogenic agents causing acute and/or chronic
toxicity, the allowable standard usually has built in safety factors
to account for uncertainties in the data and to protect susceptible
individuals. The extrapolation methods used for cancer or noncancer endpoints depend upon an understanding of the toxicological
mechanisms involved in the dose response relationship.34

33

One can not directly compare a risk-related standard with “more likely
than not” in that the former is based upon an absolute risk while the latter is a
comparative risk. For example, the absolute risk standard might be set at one
cancer among 100,000 individuals exposed for a lifetime. If the background risk
was a 1% lifetime risk of this cancer among all Americans (i.e., 1,000 among
100,000 lifetime), then exposing 100,000 citizens lifetime to the minimum
allowable level would lead to 1,001 cancers in this population. For any one of
these individuals, the likelihood that their cancer was due to the allowable
exposure level is 1/1,001—far below a “more likely than not” bright line.
However, if this were a very rare cancer, such that the lifetime background
incidence was only 1/100,000 Americans, then lifetime exposure at the
allowable concentration would double the number of cases, one of which would
be due to the chemical exposure. Risk assessors are rarely presented with the
latter scenario because scientists would be unaware of the scenario even if it did
exist.
34
Note that the goal of environmental health science is that all decisions
about regulating synthetic chemicals should be based solely on animal or in
vitro data. By definition, an epidemiological study demonstrating a cause-andeffect relationship in humans represents a failure of toxicology as a preventive
science. Ideally, there should be enough information about a new chemical from
safety assessment in laboratory animals, and enough strength in our public
health infrastructure, such that no adverse consequences from exposure to this
chemical ever occur in humans.
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V. SYSTEMS A PPROACHES VS. REDUCTIONISM: ARE
ENVIRONMENTAL H EALTH SCIENCE AND T OXIC TORT
J URISPRUDENCE G OING IN DIFFERENT DIRECTIONS?
Environmental health science and toxic tort law appear to be
going in opposite directions. The various disciplinary components
of environmental health sciences are increasingly complex and
interrelated. Boundaries between these disciplines are becoming
blurred. Systems approaches are increasingly recognized as the
methods by which scientific reasoning will improve our
understanding of causal relations. In contrast, the American judicial
system appears to be responding to the increasing breadth and
complexity of environmental health science by searching for simple
uni-dimensional solutions for toxic tort issues which increasingly
exclude modern scientific reasoning. The Daubert35 decision and its
progeny, providing judges with the role of gatekeeper, has
furthered this trend to reductionism.
The emphasis on systems approaches, in contradistinction to
reductionism, is not restricted to environmental health sciences but
is rather part of the scientific worldview of the early 21st Century.
This reflects the maturation of the scientific community in
recognizing that understanding our planet and its components
requires approaches that transcend any single discipline.36 It also
reflects the recognition by those responsible for the funding of
science that there is a growing gap between scientific advances and
the applicability of these advances for the public good.
The emphasis on multi-, inter- or trans-disciplinary science is
increasing, as is the emphasis on translation of science to decision
makers. The breadth and depth of this emphasis is evident in the
new directions taken by major science funding organizations, such
35

Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
Even as seemingly narrow a field as high energy physics has been
evolving toward multidisciplinary research as the norm. NATIONAL RESEARCH
COUNCIL , COOPERATIVE STEWARDSHIP: MANAGING THE NATION ’S
MULTIDISCIPLINARY USER FACILITIES FOR RESEARCH WITH SYNCHROTRON
RADIATION , N EUTRONS, AND H IGH MAGNETIC FIELDS (National Academy
Press 1999).
36
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as the National Science Foundation (“NSF”) and the National
Institutes of Health (“NIH”). Similarly, the translation of science
to the public is receiving greater emphasis, particularly at NIH as
Congress asks for evidence that the doubling of the institute’s
budget has been of value to taxpayers. This relatively new pursuit
of science translation emphasizes the involvement of multiple
disciplines. Increasingly, funding of new scientific research by
these organizations requires teams of scientists from a broad range
of disciplines. The current head of the NIH has used funds taken
from each of the NIH components for competitive new
interdisciplinary centers.37
As the science becomes more complex, the judicial system
appears, at least in part, to have become more reductionist in its
approach. An example of this reductionist approach is the search
for a bright line, such as a relative risk of 2.0, which some courts
use as a measuring stick by which to evaluate toxic tort claims. It is
a human trait to look for some simplifying concept that cuts
through a confusing mass of detail to provide answers that can be
phrased as yes or no, and this trait is magnified by the extent to
which one is unfamiliar or uncomfortable with the tenets of the
field.38
Perhaps one of the reasons courts are becoming more
reductionist in their approach to evaluating toxic torts is that judges
37

E.A. Zerhouni, Clinical Research at a Crossroads: The NIH Roadmap,
54(4) J. INVESTIG . MED . 171 (2006); Office of Portfolio Analysis and Strategic
Initiatives, Overview of the NIH Roadmap, http://nihroadmap.nih.gov/
overview.asp (last visited Apr. 20, 2008). Systems theory is not confined to
laboratory sciences. Under systems theory, the socio-ecological model of human
health examines cumulative effects on human health of multiple conditions,
ranging from the quality of housing to the presence of disease vectors. Systems
approaches also are increasingly being used for complex assessments, such as the
Millennium Ecosystem Assessment for global climate change which involved
over 1300 scientists providing five technical documents and six synthesis
reports. Millennium Ecosystem Assessment, Overview of the Millennium
Ecosystem Assessment, http://www.millenniumassessment.org/en/About.aspx
(last visited Apr. 20, 2008).
38
See infra text accompanying footnotes 50–51 for three specific examples
in which certain courts would automatically reject the scientific evidence
supporting more than a doubling of risk (RR > 2.0) for an individual plaintiff.
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are familiar with situations in which a bright line does exist, e.g.,
drunk driving statutes and speed limits. Even in these cases,
however, judges recognize that there are imperfections in the
measuring device.39 It is hard to imagine anyone getting fined for a
blood alcohol level of 6.0 mg/100 ml (the inherent variability of the
measurement is at least 0.1 mg). We also all know that we can with
impunity drive 57 mph in a 55 mph speed zone. Similarly, a
strictly applied bright-line rule is inappropriate in toxic tort cases
as the technical precision of the determination of relative risk in an
epidemiological study is usually far more imprecise than a blood
alcohol determination or a radar gun.
As described above, “weight of evidence” is a relatively formal
approach that attempts to encapsulate the scientific judgment of
the broad scientific community using all of the evidence on hand. In
a toxic tort case, the basis for the judgment of an individual expert
witness is subject to intense review. Lawyers insist on the expert
delineating the specific scientific publications or authoritative texts
on which the expert’s opinion is based, and then subjecting each
source to intense scrutiny. Any limitation is highlighted, and
virtually all studies have limitations. The usual scientist’s
hesitancy to be absolutely certain is exploited to the fullest. 40
While a weight of evidence approach will consider the totality of
the evidence, including limitations, the lawyer will attempt to
discard every paper that is less than perfect—clearly a reductionist
approach.41
39

David H. Kaye & David A. Freedman, Reference Guide on Statistics, in
REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 145 (2d ed., Federal Judicial
Center 2000).
40
Note that a scientist has little to lose by being careful about an original
observation. If the scientist turns out to be correct, he or she will get full credit.
If incorrect, the hesitancy will protect the scientist’s reputation. As a corollary, a
vociferous assertion that their interpretation must be right runs counter to the
culture of science and is not a way to favorably impress one’s colleagues.
41
Using the technique of going into minute detail about every study
underlying the weight of evidence, with the intention of discarding the
foundation for an otherwise sound scientific conclusion, has been called
“corpuscularization” when applied to regulatory law or toxic torts. Thomas O.
McGarity, On the Prospect of “Daubertizing” Judicial Review of Risk
Assessment 66 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 155, 155, 157 (2003); Thomas O.
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There is justification for attempting to simplify science in a
toxic tort case. A legal decision cannot wait for a complex scientific
issue to become clarified. Further, many of the questions faced in
toxic tort cases may be one of a kind—is it more likely than not
that this specific exposure situation led to this specific adverse
outcome in this specific individual? The judicial system certainly
needs to make decisions in a timely fashion based upon the
evidence at hand. However, the current process is not achieving
this goal in a manner that is based on the best possible science and,
accordingly, the process is unfair for both the plaintiff and
defendant. Further, this attempt at simplification does not excuse
the almost total disregard of the scientific discipline of toxicology.
I now discuss two examples of the law’s search for
simplification of environmental science and give examples of dose
issues that seem to be ignored in this search.42
A. The Havner43 Rule As A Trend Toward Simplification
The Havner Rule in Texas reflects the trend toward
simplification when courts determine whether an epidemiological
finding of more than doubling of a relative risk (RR 2.0) satisfies
the “more likely than not” evidentiary rule employed in tort
litigation.44 The Havner Court found for the defendant and ruled
McGarity, Our Science is Sound Science and Their Science is Junk Science:
Science-based Strategies for Avoiding Accountability and Responsibility for
Risk-producing Products and Authorities, 52 U. KAN . L. REV . 897, 921–22
(2004).
42
I was an expert for the plaintiff in a case in which the jury’s verdict was
overturned by a Havner appeal, Exxon Corp. v. Makofski, 116 S.W.3d 176
(Tex. 2003), and I provided an opinion concerning summary judgment for the
plaintiff in the Parker case. My involvement in toxic tort cases through the
years, and currently, has been roughly equal for defendants and for plaintiffs.
43
Merrell Dow Pharms. v. Havner, 953 S.W.2d 706, 716 (Tex. 1997).
44
Several authors have written about the issue and the shortcomings of
using RR > 2.0 as a surrogate for the “more likely than not” standard. See,
e.g., Sander Greenland, Relation of Probability of Causation to Relative Risk
and Doubling Dose: A Methodologic Error That Has Become a Social
Problem, 89 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1166 (1999); Sander Greenland & James M.
Robbins, Epidemiology, Justice, and the Probability of Causation, 40
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that the expert evidence submitted by the plaintiffs was not
scientifically reliable to prove that the birth defect suffered by their
child was due to the drug Bendectin. The court established a
benchmark for general causation of at least two published
epidemiological studies in which there was a statistically significant
relative risk greater than 2.0.
The reasoning used by the Havner Court is straightforward. If
in a given population of exposed individuals, ten individuals were
expected to suffer from a specific disease without any exposure,
and an epidemiological study shows that in fact there were nineteen
diagnosed with the disease (a RR of 19/10 = 1.9), then for any one
of these individuals it is more likely than not (10 to 9) that they
belong in the group who would have contracted the disease for a
reason unrelated to the exposure. However, if the epidemiological
study finds that 21 were diagnosed with the disease (RR 21/10 =
2.1), then for any one of these individuals it is more likely than not
(11 to 10) that they belong in the group who have contracted the
disease from the exposure rather than the group who would have
developed the disease without the exposure. In addition to the RR
2.0 threshold, the Havner rule requires that each of the two studies
showing a RR > 2.0 be statistically significant at the 95% level.45

JURIMETRICS 321 (2000). This includes a study by my colleague Russellyn
Carruth that charts the extent to which this bright line is being used for general
or specific causation and considers the scientific and public health problems
posed. Russellyn S. Carruth & Bernard D. Goldstein, Relative Risk Greater
than Two in Proof of Causation in Toxic Tort Litigation, 41 JURIMETRICS 195
(2001). Among these problems is the healthy worker effect. Workers are much
healthier than the general population for many causes of death (e.g., a major
cause of lymphoma is HIV/AIDS. Intravenous drug addicts at high risk for
HIV/AIDS are far less likely to be part of a chemical or petrochemical industry
work force). If the workforce has a 25% lesser likelihood of dying of a specific
disease than the general population (i.e., RR = 0.75), introduction of a chemical
that doubled this risk would lead to RR = 1.5 compared to the general
population. There are also issues related to the biological model chosen. J.
Beyea & Sander Greenland, The Importance of Specifying the Underlying
Biologic Model in Estimating the Probability of Causation, 76(3) HEALTH
PHYS. 269 (1999).
45
Havner, 953 S.W.2d at 727 (“[A] single study would not be viewed as
indicating that it is ‘more probable than not’ that an association exists.”).
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The Havner requirement for more than one study with a RR >
2.0 also appears to take out of context epidemiologists’ skeptical
rule of thumb concerning risks that are not very high above normal
levels. This skepticism is warranted by three common and related
problems in epidemiology: the vagaries of statistical variation, the
cluster fallacy, and “publication bias.”46 However, this rule of
thumb is primarily applicable to initial unconfirmed reports that do
not fit into scientific expectations based upon the totality of the
information available. In applying this rule of thumb, scientists are
in essence weighing the preponderance of evidence.47 The Havner
46

The “cluster fallacy” is inherent in how the choice is made as to what is
to be studied. For example, of 200 elementary schools in a city, the normal
statistical distribution of childhood leukemia implies that 190 schools have
levels of leukemia within the 95% statistical distribution; 5 schools have less
than this 95% expectation and 5 schools have more leukemia during a specific
time period. It is not unlikely that parents in one of the schools with a high
incidence of leukemia will raise the alarm to public health authorities (and to
newspapers). The public health authorities will do an epidemiological study
confirming that the observed incidence indeed exceeds the 95% expectation, but
there is no likelihood that the parents in the low incidence school will ask for a
study because the lower incidence of leukemia among their children would not
be noticed. Recognition of disease clusters has been the basis for discovery of
new and unexpected causal relationships, such as hepatic angiosarcoma and
vinyl chloride, but most clusters turn out to be chance associations.
“Publication bias” is related to clustering in the sense that career considerations
lead epidemiologists to prefer to pursue data that at least preliminarily show an
association rather than those that do not. In part, this is due to the importance of
publishing in better scientific journals and the natural reluctance of editors of
these competing journals to publish negative data. If at first look there does not
appear to be a publishable finding, the observation is not pursued and no
scientific paper results. An overview of the issues presented by cluster
investigations can be found in D. Wartenberg, Should We Boost Or Bust
Cluster Investigations?, 6(6) EPIDEMIOLOGY 575–76 (1995).
47
Havner, 953 S.W.2d at 716. As one example, Dimitrios Trichopoulos, a
Harvard epidemiologist, reacted negatively to being quoted in an article about
epidemiological evidence as saying that only a fourfold increase in risk should
be taken seriously. In his letter he stated, “This is correct, but only when the
finding stands in a biological vacuum or has little or no biological credibility.”
Dimitrios Trichopoulos, The Discipline of Epidemiology, 269(5229) SCIENCE
1326 (1995). He then went on to cite such epidemiological findings as the 3%
difference in births of males as compared to females. Id.

574

JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY

rule and other jurisdictions that rely solely on epidemiology strip
away the animal and in vitro studies that form such a large part of
the preponderance of evidence about toxic agents.
It is understandable that judges want to provide a simplified
way to interpret the maze of science related to toxic agents. There
are good reasons to do so, particularly given the crowded court
calendars and high cost of toxic tort litigation. Extrapolation among
scientific findings can be difficult, but the reductionism involved in
the Havner rule goes well beyond what is needed to prevent
obfuscation by experts waving scientific evidence as a flag rather
than weighing it as an aid in the understanding of judges and juries.
Below are three hypothetical examples that are fully consistent
with either the “more likely than not” or “preponderance of proof”
rationale for a doubling of a relative risk, but such examples would
be excluded from consideration in Texas because of the failure to
exceed either the RR > 2.0 or the 95% statistical significance test.
Two of the examples refer to dose, which, as noted earlier, is
defined as concentration multiplied by the duration of exposure.48
As another example, the relation of cigarette smoking to cancers other than
lung cancer is often characterized by statistically significant relative risks less
than 2.0. The risk of bladder cancer in European men after 20 years of smoking
is reported by World Health Organization scientists as an odds ratio of 1.96
with a 95% confidence interval of 1.48 to 2.61. P. Brennan et al., Cigarette
Smoking and Bladder Cancer in Men: A Pooled Analysis of 11 Case-Control
Studies, 86(2) INT . J. C ANCER 289 (2000).
One can derive another hypothetical from the latter study similar to
Example 2 below. Assume that in this study of bladder cancer and cigarette
smoking the average extent of smoking was one pack a day for the 20-year
period. Also assume a plaintiff with bladder cancer could demonstrate that he
smoked two packs a day for 20 years; that, as well known, other effects of
smoking were roughly twice as high in those who smoked two packs as
compared to one pack a day; and that there was ample literature demonstrating
that the more one smoked, the more carcinogens are found in the urine having
first passed through the bladder. Further, the plaintiff had no other competing
causes of bladder cancer and the plaintiff’s age-related risk was no different than
reported in the study. From a toxicologist’s viewpoint, based on this set of facts
it is obvious that a two pack a day smoker for twenty years has more than a
doubling of risk of bladder cancer. Notwithstanding, this case would be
precluded in a jurisdiction requiring RR > 2.0 for general causation.
48
The difference in how toxicological scientists and the Texas Supreme
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The third example relates to statistical significance.49
Example 1. Dose Dependency: The Effect of Duration
Assume that there is a common workplace process that
consistently exposes workers to 10 parts per million (ppm) of
chemical XYZ in the air throughout the workday, and that chemical
XYZ is supplied by a chemical company that allegedly should have
communicated about XYZ’s potential for risk. XYZ is found to
produce a specific adverse effect in laboratory animals in a dose
dependent fashion. These findings in laboratory animals lead to
two studies of cohorts of exposed workers which show that there
is an 80% higher incidence of this adverse effect than expected (i.e.,
RR 1.8), and that in each study the increase in risk is statistically
significant at the 95% level. The average duration of exposure in the
workers is fifteen years. In subsets of workers exposed for periods
greater than thirty years, there is, as expected, twice the relative
risk than observed in those exposed for fifteen years (i.e, a 160%
Court view dose is evident from Borg-Warner Corp. v. Flores, 232 S.W.3d
765 (Tex. 2007), a recent Texas Supreme Court decision extending Havner. In
this decision the court repetitively referred to the “dose makes the poison” as a
major rationale for reversing a lower court finding in favor of a plaintiff exposed
to asbestos while working on brake lining. Id. at 770. See also Parker v. Mobil
Oil Corp., 793 N.Y.S.2d 434 (N.Y. App. Div. 2005), aff’d, 857 N.E.2d 1114
(N.Y. 2006), reh’g denied, 861 N.E.2d 104 (N.Y. 2007); but see Chapin v.
A&L Parts, Inc., 732 N.W.2d 578 (Mich. Ct. App. 2007); Laura S. Welch,
Asbestos Exposure Causes Mesothelioma, But Not This Asbestos Exposure: An
Amicus Brief to the Michigan Supreme Court, 13 INT ’ L . J. OCCUPATIONAL &
ENVTL. HEALTH 318 (2007). As noted by John S. Gray, “Some” is No Longer
Enough in Texas Toxic Tort Cases, 45 HOUSTON LAW . 54 (2007), the Texas
court in Borg-Warner Corp. v. Flores required that there be epidemiological
findings specifically for brake lining workers. 232 S.W.3d at 7. They further
require that if there are multiple defendants contributing to the asbestos levels,
only those whose dose is a substantial factor can be held liable. Id. at 4; see also
Richard O. Faulk & Joy E. Palazzo, Texas High Court Heightens Scientific
Evidence Standards, 22 LEGAL BACKGROUNDER 1 (2007).
49
What is unrealistic about these examples is the absence of any
mechanistic data about XYZ that would help interpret the epidemiologic data.
Such data would exist, or be rapidly obtained after XYZ was reported to be a
potential human toxin, but would not be admissible in these instances.
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higher incidence which is equivalent to RR 2.6, i.e., more than a
doubling of risk), but because the groups are small, the findings are
not statistically significant for these subsets. Under Havner, the
workers with the longer exposure would not be able to sue, despite
the evidence from laboratory animals of dose dependency and the
reasonable expectation that doubling the duration of exposure
would double the risk such that it would be greater than 2.0.
Example 2. Dose Dependency: The Effect of Concentration
Assume that chemical XYZ had been found to be particularly
useful by a small business owner specializing in restoring antique
cars. He has used XYZ almost every work day for fifteen years in
his poorly ventilated shop before developing the specific adverse
effect now shown in epidemiological and animal studies to be
causally related to chemical XYZ. An expert industrial hygienist
has estimated that daily workplace exposure averaged 100 ppm,
which is ten times higher than that in the much larger workplaces
on which cohort studies are based. A physician toxicologist
reviewing the dose-response data is prepared to testify that in
keeping with this dose response data, the risk for an individual
exposed at the workplace to 100 ppm daily for fifteen years is ten
times higher than the 80% increase observed in the cohort of
workers exposed to 10 ppm for an average of fifteen years (as a
simplification, this would be equivalent to an 800% increase in risk
or RR 9.0).
If the exposure and the dose response estimations are correct, it
is far more likely than not that this individual is suffering from the
adverse effect due to exposure to XYZ. Notwithstanding this
scientific determination, the plaintiff cannot present his claim
before a jury in a Texas state court or in any other jurisdiction that
requires dose-specific epidemiological evidence of RR > 2.0 for
general causation.50

50

An individual’s anachronistic exposure to a very high chemical dose is
often the basis for human harm, but is usually too rare for an epidemiologic
study.
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Example 3. Statistical Inconsistency
Assume that there are only two epidemiologic studies on
chemical XYZ in cohorts of workers. The first study, in a large
cohort, reported a statistically significant RR > 2.0. The second
study, despite a relative risk of 6.3, has a smaller cohort size and
95% confidence intervals of 0.9–16.8, (i.e., it is not statistically
significant at the 95% level). The plaintiff’s claim would fail the
Havner test as there would be only one study that is statistically
significant at the 95% level. A researcher could calculate a 50%
confidence limit as well as a 95% confidence limit from the data in
the second study, however. A 50% confidence limit is basically the
range within which 50% of the likely outcomes would fall. If the
lower limit of the 50% confidence limit was above 2.0, it is
consistent with “more likely than not” (i.e., more than half the
expected outcomes are above a relative risk of two). Requiring a
plaintiff present scientific evidence with RR > 2.0 and statistical
significance at the 95% level is in reality more strict than “more
likely than not,” even if one were to accept that an epidemiological
finding of RR > 2.0 is an appropriate criterion. It also seems
contradictory to insist that the science used in a toxic tort case
should conform to a nineteen to one ratio of certainty (which
essentially is a 95% confidence level), while at the same time
focusing on “more likely than not.”
B. The Parker51 Rulings: Struggling With Chemical Risk
The Parker litigation52 is an example of decisions from two
levels of the New York State judiciary that appear to run counter
to how toxicological scientists consider dose issues in cause and
effect relationships, although the higher court overruled the lower
court on one of these issues. Both the trial court and the appellate

51

Parker v. Mobil Oil Corp., 793 N.Y.S.2d 434 (N.Y. App. Div. 2005),
aff’d, 857 N.E.2d 1114 (N.Y. 2006), reargument denied, 861 N.E.2d 104
(N.Y. 2007).
52
Id.
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court implement reductionist approaches in the sense that neither
court permits an expert to bring to court the full range of scientific
evidence that would appropriately and logically be used in forming
an expert opinion. In Parker, the plaintiff had worked for
seventeen years as a gas station attendant and claimed that he had a
particularly high level of exposure to gasoline due to his work
practices which led to his developing acute myelogenous
leukemia.53 Gasoline is a blend of chemicals that in its usual
formulation always contains benzene. There was no argument on
general causation as benzene is a known cause of this disease. The
Appellate Division of the New York Supreme Court granted a
motion from the defendants to dismiss the complaint, primarily
because the plaintiff’s expert reports had failed to quantify the
exposure beyond claiming it was higher than that observed in
cohorts of petroleum refinery workers. On appeal, the New York
Court of Appeals rejected the Appellate Division’s requirement
that the amount of exposure must be quantified exactly.54 Notably,
the Court of Appeals nonetheless found for the defendants based
on the failure of the plaintiff to show epidemiological evidence that
exposure to gasoline causes leukemia.55
If the court’s finding was carried to its logical conclusion, one
could never assign causation to any benzene source except to pure
benzene and to a specific benzene-containing mixture for which
there is already epidemiological evidence. Industry would be able to
market any benzene mixture for which there is now no
epidemiological evidence without fear of toxic tort litigation
because the specific mixture had not been studied.56
Benzene exposure leading to health effects historically has been
to benzene in mixtures. This is in part because commercial grade
benzene usually had substantial amounts of related hydrocarbon
solvents that traveled with benzene during the crude refinery
processes of the past. Thus, in the past, compounds such as

53

Id. at 442.
Id. at 438.
55
Id. at 438–39.
56
Gasoline is a blend that contains various amounts of benzene; usually 12% in the United States but up to 5% in other countries.
54
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toluene, ethyl benzene, xylenes and cumene—none of which cause
leukemia—were often heavily contaminated by benzene. The
extent of contamination in the past led to the erroneous belief that
toluene was also a cause of bone marrow damage—the hallmark of
benzene toxicity. In addition to the vagaries of the refinery
processes, the level of benzene in these aromatic mixtures also
depended on commercial needs. For example, removal of toluene
from benzene becomes more commercially viable during wartime
when toluene is used as a base for the production of trinitrotoluene
(“TNT”).
There was never any question that Parker was exposed to
benzene, and there was never any question that benzene is a cause
of acute myelogenous leukemia. Instead of considering whether the
dose of benzene was sufficient under the circumstances of Parker’s
work practices, the court acknowledged that benzene was a
medically probable cause of his leukemia but nevertheless enforced
a requirement for epidemiology that cannot conceivably be
performed under the circumstance in which the plaintiff alleges he
was exposed.57 There simply are not enough individuals with this
particular work practice to ever be sufficient for an epidemiological
study. 58

57

“Key to this litigation is the relationship, if any, between exposure to
gasoline containing benzene as a component and AML.” Parker v. Mobil Oil
Corp., 857 N.E.2d 1114 (N.Y. 2006) (emphasis in original). The court in
Parker cited two other cases recognizing that an expert may not need to
establish an exact number for the dosage at which a substance is toxic and the
amount of exposure the plaintiff experienced. Id. at 1121 (citing McClain v.
Metabolife Intl., Inc., 401 F.3d 1233, 1241 n.6 (11th Cir. 2005); Wright v.
Willamette Indus., Inc., 91 F.3d 1105, 1107 (8th Cir. 1996)).
58
I am not arguing that exposure to benzene in gasoline is or is not a
reasonable medical probable cause of blood cancers. My short letter opinion on
the Parker case was solely limited to whether the defense’s request for summary
judgment was justified. I did not opine on whether it was more likely than not
that the plaintiff’s exposure was the cause of his leukemia. My three arguments
in favor of letting the case go to a jury were that the description of the plaintiff’s
exposure, including dermal exposure, would lead him to have higher exposure
than observed among gasoline refinery workers; that there was at least some
epidemiological evidence of a more than doubling of risk in these workers for
which I cited one study; and that the plaintiff was relatively unique in having a
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While recognizing that I am arguing as a toxicologist and not a
legal expert, it nonetheless seems that the burden of proof should
be on the defense to argue that, per unit dose, benzene in gasoline is
any less likely to be a cause of leukemia than benzene in any other
mixture. Instead the burden of proof is now on the plaintiff to
demonstrate epidemiological evidence that benzene in a specific
mixture is a cause of leukemia, despite the fact that benzene itself is
fully accepted as a cause of leukemia. In essence, the action of the
court was to replace a scientific argument concerning dose and
specific causation. The court did so with a requirement for an
epidemiological study to prove general causation before being able
to consider specific causation.59
VI. T HE EXCLUSION OF A NIMAL T OXICOLOGY AND
M ECHANISTIC INFORMATION FROM T OXIC T ORTS: LEGAL
REDUCTIONISM
To a toxicologist, the reductionist tendency of the law that is
most difficult to understand is the often seemingly dismissive
attitude of toxic torts jurisprudence to the science of poisons. The
failure to consider toxicology does a disservice to defendants as
well as plaintiffs. It is quite possible to construct a large reference
list of agents that have been epidemiologically associated with
history of radiation exposure. Atom bomb survivors who developed leukemia
are reportedly more likely to have workplace benzene exposure than those who
did not develop leukemia. Toranosuke Ishimaru, Occupational factors in the
epidemiology of leukemia in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, 93(3) AM. J.
EPIDEMIOLOGY 157–65 (1971).
59
This is similar to arguing that there is a need for an epidemiologic study
demonstrating that a Chevrolet can cause trauma if it runs into a pedestrian if
prior studies only involved Fords. When it comes to damaging a human,
automobiles are automobiles, and benzene is benzene. Both products have the
potential, but the extent of damage, if any, depends upon the circumstances. In
this case the court prevented the jury from hearing the circumstances. Two
authors that take up the issue of jury exclusion are CARL F. CRANOR, JudgeJury Responsibilities and the Right to a Jury Trial, in T OXIC TORTS: SCIENCE,
LAW , AND THE POSSIBILITY OF JUSTICE 70, 70–71 (2006) and Michael H.
Gottesman, From Barefoot to Daubert to Joiner: Triple Play or Double
Error?, 40 ARIZ . L. REV . 753, 776 (1998).
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virtually any disease, and these lists are readily accessible to the
plaintiffs’ bar.
The body of studies associating specific agents with a number
of different diseases reflects the many epidemiological studies that
attempt to uncover previously unobserved relationships by
searching for associations among large databases. These are often
called “hypothesis generating” studies. Such studies are highly
appropriate in that they contribute to developing further studies
aimed at specifically exploring the possible cause and effect
relationship generated in the initial study. However, hypothesis
generating studies have the inherent weakness that some
statistically significant association will occur when there are enough
questions being asked. For example, a common approach is to start
with the diagnoses in a given hospital population, or the causes of
mortality stated on death certificates in a given geographical
location, and relate these to the occupation of the hospital patient
or the potential environmental factors associated with a
geographical location. There are many different diseases, many
different occupations, and many different localized environmental
factors. Using a standard statistical approach in which in essence
one chance variation out of 20 is reported as statistically
significant, it is inevitable that some associations of some disease
with some chemical will be noted.
Many studies retrospectively look at what has happened in the
past. Testing the hypotheses generated in such studies can be done
in a number of ways, including further epidemiological studies. A
more probable response, which is far quicker and far less
expensive, are toxicological studies in laboratory animals searching
for the same effect, or mechanistic studies aimed at determining if
there is a likely pathway by which the chemical causes the putative
effect, rather than just a statistical association with no causality. 60
60

An example of both a hypothesis-evaluating and hypothesis-generating
study is the Agricultural Health Study, a large scale study of the health of
farmers by the National Cancer Institute. M.C. Alvanja et al., The Agricultural
Health Study, 104(4) ENVTL . HEALTH PERSP. 362 (1996). The study is aimed
at testing the cancer risk of American farmers and follows a number of smaller
studies that have reported an increased risk of non-Hodgkin’s lymphoma and
other cancers. Over 80,000 farmers are being followed prospectively, with careful
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It is appropriate to fully depend upon studies in humans if
there is direct epidemiological evidence of the tort and there are no
competing causes in the individual for exposure to the agent or risk
factors for the disease. In most instances there is little or no direct
epidemiological evidence related to the plaintiff’s exposure. Instead
inferences that often depend upon an analysis of all of the
pertinent information for scientific acceptability must be made
from the existing epidemiological literature.
In epidemiology, the gold standard has long been the
randomized double blind control trial. This standard, although
difficult, can be achieved when testing drugs or other therapeutic
approaches. However, it cannot be achieved in epidemiological
studies of chemicals in the workplace or general environment.
Inevitably, such studies are observational studies with various
degrees of strengths, but all requiring some degree of inference or
extrapolation. While it is true that animal toxicology always
requires extrapolation across species, it is also true that animal
toxicology can be rigidly controlled in a way that is not possible in
epidemiological studies of the workplace or the general
community. 61
A classic cohort epidemiological study will often describe a

attention to present and past exposures to pesticides and other chemical and
biological agents common to agricultural activities. A comprehensive health and
exposure questionnaire has been developed that seeks information on multiple
health endpoints. The prospective study should have ample power to test
hypotheses related to farmers and cancer, but the questionnaire inevitably leads
to hypothesis-generating studies. See George M. Gray et al., The Federal
Government’s Agricultural Health Study: A Critical Review with Suggested
Improvements, 6(1) HUM. & ECOLOGICAL R ISK ASSESSMENT 47 (2000). For
example, there are 800 possible associations in a study evaluating 20 different
pesticides and 40 different health endpoints. It is inevitable that there will be
statistically significant associations between a specific pesticide and a specific
health endpoint that occur by chance alone. Statistical correction factors are used
to approach this problem, but as the goal is the generation of hypotheses rather
than the assignment of causation, it is not inappropriate that the association be
reported and left for others to explore whether true causality exists. This will
often depend upon animal toxicology and mechanistic studies.
61
See discussion in Joseph V. Rodricks, Evaluating Disease Causation in
Humans Exposed to Toxic Substances, 14 J.L. & POL ’ Y 39 (2006).

TOXIC TORTS: THE DEVIL IS IN THE DOSE

583

relatively large number of workers of whom usually only a small
percent suffer from the disease of interest. Further, not all of the
cohort is substantially exposed to the agent of concern.62 This is in
contrast to a drug trial in which everyone in the treatment group
receives the same dose of a drug and everyone in the control group
receives a placebo.
Toxicological research focusing on the mechanism of action of
chemicals can also be useful in clarifying medical nomenclature—an
issue that can present a problem to judges and juries. In the field of
medicine, the nomenclature of disease is usually based on what is
observable. One example is asthma, the diagnosis of which depends
primarily upon whether an individual has the particular type of
breath sound known as a wheeze. In essence, asthma is purely a
descriptive term depending upon a physical sign. Wheezing reflects
the narrowing of major airways within the lung and is a final
common denominator of many different types of extrinsic causes
and intrinsic susceptibilities.
Advances in molecular biology will allow us to discard the term
asthma and use diagnostic terms that describe the direct intrinsic or
extrinsic causes of lung disease that is accompanied by wheezing.
The opposite occurs for other diseases, such as leukemia, for which

62

Classic epidemiological studies evaluating the mortality of a
petrochemical or chemical industry workforce can underestimate true effects at the
work site both by including workers whose exposure is relatively minimal, e.g.,
those working in the cafeteria or in accounts payable, and by excluding those
who may have high exposure but who work for subcontractors rather than the
industry, e.g., maintenance workers who clean up after product spills, or as in a
recent Delaware case, millwrights who replace leaky valves. Texaco to Pay
Worker’s Widow $2.84 Million, DELAWARE ONLINE , 2007, available at
http://www.delawareonline.com/apps/pbcs.d11/article?AID=/20071106/NEWS/
711060390.
Some of the problems of cohort studies can be approached by nested case
control studies. For example, in a study of refinery workers whose overall
relative risk was slightly less than 1.0, a nested case control study found that for
those who did develop leukemia there was more than a doubling of risk that
they were exposed to higher rather than lower doses of benzene at the workplace.
L. Rushton & M.R. Alderson, A Case-Control Study to Investigate the
Association Between Exposure to Benzene and Deaths from Lukemia in Oil
Refinery Workers, 43 BRIT . J. C ANCER 77 (1981).

584

JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY

nomenclature tends to split diseases that are closely related. The
recognition of different subtypes of leukemia is abetted by the
ready availability of blood or bone marrow which allows
microscopic observation of multiple samples as the disease
progresses—something that, at least until recently, has been
unusual for cancers of most other organs for which a biopsy is a
relatively major procedure. Thus, differences in morphology could
readily be related to differences in clinical course or outcome. Yet
with the use of modern molecular biology, we find that there are
overlapping molecular characteristics between such disorders as
acute myelogenous leukemia, the form more commonly observed in
adults, and acute lymphoblastic leukemia, the form more
commonly observed in children. This is not surprising as both the
lymphocytic and myelocytic cell series derive from a common
pluripotential cell. If the mutation that leads to cancer occurs
sufficiently early in the differentiation process, the cancer will have
characteristics of both cell series.63
63

The medical literature also tends to be confusing for toxic tort litigation
because of the organizational structure of medical specialties and their journals.
For example, a relatively minor brain tumor type is a solitary lymphoma. The
patient will usually present to a neurologist for the evaluation of symptoms
related to a space-occupying lesion in the central nervous system. After biopsy
demonstrating a lymphoma, and further evaluation that shows that the
lymphoma is localized to the one location in the brain, the neurologist will
identify the patient as suffering from a Primary Central Nervous System
Lymphoma (“PCNSL”). In terms of nomenclature, PCNSL merely identifies the
anatomical location of a tumor type. To a hematologist who might be called
upon to prescribe the appropriate chemotherapy for this localized lymphoma, the
primary concern will be which pathological subtype of lymphoma cells and
organizational structure are present as this will guide treatment, e.g., B-cell or
T-cell; follicular or diffuse, etc. Lymphomas are discussed or classified in the
hematological literature in terms of pathological subtype. For example, see the
Revised European-American Lymphoma Classification which lists about 40
lymphoma subtypes in terms of morphology, phenotype and genotype, without
mentioning PCNSL. T HOMAS J. K IPPS, W ILLIAMS HEMATOLOGY 1316–17 (7th
ed. 2006).
In terms of toxic torts, a hematologist convinced that benzene can cause
lymphoma would reason that the location of the lymphoma is of little
consequence as lymphocytes are diffusely present within the body, are known to
move from organ to organ, and localized lymphomas are not unusual in almost
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Also favorable to the defendant is the use of mechanistic
understanding to discard a presumed cause and effect relationship.
For example, saccharin has been downgraded by the National
Toxicology Program from its previous listing as reasonably
anticipated to be a human carcinogen.64 A major reason for this
change was the finding of a mechanism to explain why bladder
cancer was observed in laboratory animals exposed to saccharin.
This mechanism was one that had a threshold, permitting regulators
to move away from a no-threshold model for carcinogens. The dose
to exceed the threshold was well above any reasonable expectation
in humans consuming saccharin.65
Another example of using mechanistic principles to downgrade
an epidemiological finding comes from a recent IARC review of
formaldehyde. A long term follow up of a formaldehyde-exposed
cohort by an excellent group of epidemiologists found a
statistically significant increase in leukemia incidence. However,
based on mechanistic grounds, it was difficult to conceive of a
mechanism by which exposure to formaldehyde could cause
leukemia. Despite the “strong evidence” in human studies, IARC
any part of the body; although of particularly great consequence within the
limited space of the skull. In contrast, a defense lawyer would take the
reductionist approach of insisting that there be epidemiological evidence linking
benzene specifically to PCNSL and would likely ask the court to discard any
evidence linking benzene to lymphoma as not being sufficiently specific to the
disease.
64
See National Toxicology Program: Department of Health and Human
Services, Report on Carcinogens, “Saccharin” (2005), available at
http://ntp.niehs.nih.gov/INDEX.CFM?OBJECTID=BE49AE97-F1F6-975E77FE65CCD04657CF (last visited Mar. 22, 2008).
65
Joe G. Hollingsworth & Eric G. Lasker, in a review of Daubert
avowedly from a defense lawyer’s perspective, claims that the downgrading of
the saccharin decision shows the failure of toxicology to be borne out. Joe G.
Hollingsworth & Eric G Lasker, The Case Against Differential Diagnosis:
Daubert, Medical Causation Testimony, and the Scientific Method, 37(1) J.
HEALTH L. 90 (2004). Indeed, the opposing opinion is much more accurate.
The fact that a previous weakly positive epidemiological study was not
replicated likely would not have been enough to overcome the usual regulatory
resistance to downgrading a potential human carcinogen without the new
information on mechanism. See L. B. Ellwein & S. M. Cohen, The Health
Risks of Saccharin Revisited, 20(5) CRIT . REV . T OXICOL . 311–26 (1990).
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classified the overall evidence that formaldehyde caused leukemia
as “not sufficient.”66 Similarly, evidence of cancer in laboratory
animal studies can be scientifically discounted as has occurred for
the finding that exposure of male rats to gasoline causes kidney
cancer through a mechanism not operative in humans.67
Mechanistic understanding also helps with interpreting latency
periods between exposure and disease. The latency period is a
particularly important point for understanding cancer caused by
chemicals as such periods can be too short or too long to be
consistent with the known biological processes involved in the
causation of disease. Some examples are obvious because they are
within the experience of a layperson. For instance, one can readily
reject a plaintiff’s allegation that someone hit them in the eye two
weeks before the plaintiff first noted a black eye. It would hardly
be necessary for an expert to convince a jury by giving scientific
testimony about the biological mechanisms that convert trauma
into skin discoloration. In other situations, however, understanding
of the mechanism underlying the disease process, coupled with the
existing epidemiological literature concerning latency periods, is a
66

“ The working group also found . . . ‘strong but not sufficient evidence’
for leukaemia. The finding for leukaemia reflects the epidemiologists’ finding of
strong evidence in human studies coupled with an inability to identify a
mechanism for induction of leukaemia, based on the data available at this time.”
Press Release, World Health Organization’s International Agency for Research
on Cancer, IARC Classifies Formaldehyde as Carcinogenic to Humans (June 15,
2004), available at http://www.iarc.fr/ENG/Press_Releases/archives/pr153a.
html. See also Vincent J. Cogliano et al., Meeting Report: Summary of IARC
Monographs on Formaldehyde, 2-Butoxyethanol, and 1-tert-Butoxy-2-Propanol,
113(9) ENVTL . HEALTH PERSP. 1205–08 (2005).
67
In yet another example of more inclusiveness of toxicology data, an
Institute of Medicine (“IOM”) committee has recently recommended additional
consideration of the non-epidemiological database and of dose in the evaluation
process used to classify the scientific basis for presumptive disability decisions
made by the Veterans Administration. This would be a change from the
previous process in which the IOM classification was almost totally based upon
epidemiological findings. INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE , COMMITTEE ON
EVALUATION OF THE PRESUMPTIVE DISABILITY DECISION-MAKING PROCESS
FOR VETERANS, IMPROVING THE PRESUMPTIVE D ISABILITY DECISION-MAKING
PROCESS FOR VETERANS (Jonathan M. Samet & Catherine C. Bodurow eds.,
2008).
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valuable part of evaluating a potential toxic tort.
CONCLUSION
Much of the legal commentary concerning science reflects the
issue of how to fairly bring the state of the art into the courtroom.
Supreme Court Justice Stephen Breyer commented, “A judge is not
a scientist and a courtroom is not a scientific laboratory,” but
judges “must aim for decisions that, roughly speaking,
approximately reflect the scientific state of the art.”68 The core
understanding of dose issues related to toxic torts reflects a
scientific state of art that is at least 500 years old.69 Unfortunately,
as judges attempt to simplify complex issues related to causality,
there are too many instances in which relatively simple and
straightforward scientific understanding concerning dose is being
discarded or obfuscated.

68

Justice Breyer Calls for Experts To Aid Courts in Complex Cases, N.Y.
T IMES, Feb. 17, 1998, at A17.
69
Michael A. Gallo, History and Scope of Toxicology, in CASARETT &
DOULL’S T OXICOLOGY: T HE BASIC SCIENCE OF POISONS 3–11 (Curtis D.
Klaassen ed., 5th ed. 1996).

